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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
MARK TRUDEAU, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE LLC, 
Defendant. 
 
Case No.  18-cv-00947-BLF    
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION; GRANTING 
IN PART AND TERMINATING AS 
MOOT IN PART MOTION TO 
DISMISS; DISMISSING ACTION 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
[Re: ECF 25] 
 
 
  Plaintiffs Mark Trudeau and Troy Martial Arts Inc. bring claims on behalf of themselves 
and a putative class of others similarly situated in connection with Defendant Google LLC’s 
alleged misrepresentations to advertisers using its AdWords program.  Before the Court is 
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration or Alternatively Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Class Action Complaint.  Mot., ECF 25.  The Court heard oral argument on the motion on 
September 27, 2018.  For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is 
GRANTED.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and TERMINATED AS 
MOOT IN PART.  The action is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) runs an advertising program called AdWords, which 
allows an advertiser to tie his advertisement to specific keywords, such that users of Google see 
the advertisement when they search for those keywords.  First Am. Class Action Compl. 
(“FACC”) ¶ 2, ECF 9.  AdWords also allows the advertiser to select certain negative keywords, 
such that users of Google cannot see the advertisement when they search for those negative 
keywords.  Id. ¶ 3.  But Plaintiff Troy Martial Arts Inc. and its co-owner Plaintiff Mark Trudeau 
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(collectively, “Trudeau”) claim that this negative keyword functionality does not work as 
promised.  See generally FACC.  Specifically, when a user misspells a negative keyword in his or 
her search, Google allegedly corrects that misspelling and then runs the search results for that 
word.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 30–31.  In that scenario, AdWords displays the advertisement, even though 
the search includes the negative keyword.  Id.  Trudeau thus claims that Google makes material 
misrepresentations about AdWords’ functionality.  He brings the following causes of action on 
behalf of himself and a putative class:  (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; (3) violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 
17200, et seq.; (4) violation of the False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; 
(5) declaratory relief that the arbitration clause included in the 2017 AdWords Terms of Service is 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable and unenforceable; and (6) unjust enrichment.  Id. 
¶¶ 81–118.  
Trudeau first began using the AdWords program in January 2012, when he accepted the 
AdWords Terms of Service via a clickwrap agreement.1  See id. ¶ 32; Sung Decl. ISO Mot. ¶¶ 6–
7, 14, ECF 25-1.  At the time, the 2006 Terms of Service (“TOS”) were in effect.  See Sung Decl. 
¶ 6.  In 2013, Google modified the Terms and pre-existing advertisers were given notice and asked 
to review and accept these terms.  Id.  Section 11 of the 2013 TOS included the following 
provision:   
11 Term. Google may add to, delete from or modify these Terms at any time without 
liability. The modified Terms will be posted at www.google.com/ads/terms. 
Customer should look at these Terms regularly. The changes to the Terms will not 
apply retroactively and will become effective 7 days after posting.  However, 
changes specific to new functionality or changes made for legal reasons will be 
effective immediately upon notice. . . . 
Trudeau Decl. ISO Opp., Ex. 1 (“2013 TOS”), ECF 34-2.  Several other versions of Google’s 
Terms of Service throughout the relevant period stated that “[c]hanges [to the terms] will not 
apply retroactively and will become effective no sooner than fourteen days after they are posted.”  
See Id., Ex. 2, ECF 34-3 (March 2012); Id., Ex. 3, ECF 34-4 (November 2013); Id., Ex. 4, ECF 
                                                 
1  The AdWords account was registered to Troy Martial Arts, Inc.; Plaintiff Trudeau does not have 
a separate AdWords account.  Song Decl. ¶ 14. 
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34-5 (April 2014); Id., Ex. 5, ECF 34-6 (October 2017). 
 The Terms were modified again in September 2017.  Sung Decl. ¶ 7.  Like other versions 
of the Terms of Service, the 2017 TOS includes provisions relating to changes to the terms.  In 
Section 12, the 2017 TOS states, in relevant part:   
12 Changes to Terms.  Google may make non-material changes to these Terms at 
any time without notice, but Google will provide advance notice of any material 
changes to these Terms.  The Terms will be posted at google.com/ads/terms. Other 
than changes made under Section 13(G), the changes to the Terms will not apply 
retroactively and will become effective 7 days after posting. However, changes made 
for legal reasons will be effective immediately upon notice. 
Id., Ex. C (“2017 TOS”), ECF 25-2.  Section 13(G) in turn states:  
G. Future changes to Dispute Resolution Agreement.  If Google makes any changes 
to this Dispute Resolution Agreement (other than a change to Google’s Notice 
Address), Customer or Advertiser may reject any such change by notifying Google 
via webform as set forth in Section 13(F) within 30 days of the change.  It is not 
necessary to submit a rejection of the future change to this Dispute Resolution 
Agreement if Customer or Advertiser had properly opted out of arbitration in 
compliance with the requirements of Section 13(F).  By rejecting a future change, 
Customer or Advertiser is agreeing that it will arbitrate any dispute in accordance 
with the language of this Dispute Resolution Agreement, as modified by any changes 
that Customer or Advertiser did not reject. 
Finally, Section 14 governs miscellaneous provisions and states:   
14 Miscellaneous. . . . (d) These Terms are the parties’ entire agreement relating to 
their subject matter and supersede any prior or contemporaneous agreements on 
those subjects. 
Id.  
The 2017 TOS also included, for the first time, an arbitration provision and a class action 
waiver.  Sung Decl. ¶ 8.  The arbitration provision covers, in relevant part:   
13 Dispute Resolution Agreement. 
A.  Arbitration of disputes.  Google, Customer, and Advertiser agree to arbitrate all 
disputes and claims between Google and Customer or between Google and 
Advertiser that arise out of or relate in any way to the Programs or these Terms.  This 
agreement to arbitrate (“Dispute Resolution Agreement” or “Section 13”) is intended 
to be broadly interpreted and includes, for example: 
1.  claims brought under any legal theory; 
2.  claims that arose before Customer or Advertiser first accepted any version of these 
Terms containing an arbitration provision; 
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3.  claims that may arise after the termination of Customer’s or Advertiser’s Use of 
the Programs; . . . . 
The arbitration provision also included a 30-day opt out period, stating:   
F. 30-day opt out period. Customer (both for itself and for any Advertiser that 
Customer represents) and Advertiser have the right to opt out of this Dispute 
Resolution Agreement.  A Customer or Advertiser who does not wish to be bound 
by this Dispute Resolution Agreement (including its waiver of class and 
representative claims) must notify Google as set forth below within 30 days of the 
first acceptance date of any version of these Terms containing an arbitration 
provision (unless a longer period is required by applicable law).  Customer’s or 
Advertiser’s notice to Google under this subsection must be submitted via webform 
available at adwords.google.com/nav/arbitration.  An opt-out notice does not revoke 
or otherwise affect any previous arbitration agreement between Customer and 
Google or between Advertiser and Google. 
Clicking the link in this section took the advertiser to a webpage containing the opt out procedure.  
Sung Decl. ¶ 13; see id., Ex. D, ECF 23-2. 
Google gave notice of the 2017 TOS to the AdWords advertisers through multiple means, 
including through a direct email to the advertisers, a public blog post, and an alert on the 
advertisers’ AdWords account.  Sung Decl. ¶ 7.  Each notice directed the advertisers to a webpage 
where they could review and accept the modified terms, which were displayed in a single 
embedded window.  Id. ¶ 9.  Above the TOS window was the following admonition:  “Please 
review these Terms carefully.  They include the use of binding arbitration to resolve disputes 
rather than jury trials or class actions.  Please follow the instructions in the terms below if you 
wish to opt out of this provision.”  Id., Ex. B, ECF 25-2.  Advertisers were then prompted to 
accept or decline the terms. 
Google notified Trudeau of the 2017 TOS by both email and an alert in his AdWords 
account.  Sung Decl. ¶ 16.  Trudeau accepted the 2017 TOS on September 15, 2017 and did not 
attempt to opt out of the arbitration provision.  See id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
A. Motion to Compel 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to arbitration agreements affecting interstate 
commerce.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.  When it applies, the FAA preempts state laws that conflict with 
its provisions or obstruct its objective to enforce valid arbitration agreements.  See AT&T Mobility 
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LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 341–43 (2011). 
The FAA reflects a strong policy in favor of arbitration.  Id. at 339; Ericksen, Arbuthnot, 
McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 35 Cal. 3d 312, 322 (1983).  Under the FAA, 
contractual arbitration agreements must be enforced “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 Fed. Appx. 692, 
693 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).  “In line with these principles, courts must place 
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to 
their terms.”  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (internal citations omitted); Weeks v. Crow, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 350, 353 (1980) (“The court should attempt to give effect to the parties’ intentions, in 
light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under 
which the agreement was made.” (citation omitted)).  “[W]here a contract contains an arbitration 
clause,” moreover, “courts apply a presumption in favor of arbitrability . . . and the party resisting 
arbitration bears the burden of establishing that the arbitration agreement is inapplicable.”  Wynn 
Resorts v. Atl.-Pac. Capital, Inc., 497 Fed. App’x. 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2012). 
A district court faced with a petition to enforce an arbitration clause engages in a limited 
two-part inquiry: first, it determines whether the arbitration agreement is valid, and second, it 
determines whether the agreement encompasses the claims at issue.  Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. 
Mgmt., Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015).  A district court does not consider challenges to 
the contract as a whole, but rather only specific challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause 
itself.  See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) (noting the “two types of 
validity challenges” but holding that only challenges to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate 
are “relevant to a court’s determination whether the arbitration agreement at issue is enforceable”). 
B. Motion to Dismiss 
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”  Conservation 
Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).  When determining whether a claim has been stated, the Court accepts 
as true all well-pled factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 45   Filed 10/03/18   Page 5 of 14
 6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
plaintiff.  Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011).  However, the 
Court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 
notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 
unreasonable inferences.”  In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  While a complaint need not contain detailed 
factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s review is limited to the face of the complaint and 
matters judicially noticeable.  MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986); 
N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983).  However, under the 
“incorporation by reference” doctrine, the Court also may consider documents which are 
referenced extensively in the complaint and which are accepted by all parties as authentic.  In re 
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds 
by S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008). 
If the Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 
to grant leave to amend.  Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 
amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 
of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 
technicalities.”  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint 
due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 
of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.”  See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music 
Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 
C. Judicial Notice 
The Court may generally consider matters properly subject to judicial notice.  See Tellabs, 
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Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).  In support of its motion, Google 
filed a Request for Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Reference of, in relevant part, the 2017 
TOS, the opt-out website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or declined the TOS.  See 
Mot. at 23–24.  Trudeau also incorporates additional versions of the TOS into his Opposition.  See 
Opp. at 3.  The Court agrees to take judicial notice of these documents, as they are not the subject 
of reasonable dispute and their authenticity is not in question.  Fed. R. Evid. 201.  Likewise, 
several versions of the TOS are incorporated by reference into the Complaint.  See FACC ¶¶ 56–
65, 107–114.  The documents are accepted for what they represent, but the Court is not bound by 
any specific fact findings and legal conclusions set forth in them. 
III. DISCUSSION 
In order to determine whether these claims must be compelled to arbitration or be litigated 
in this court, the Court necessarily must decide whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable—
if it were unconscionable, then it would be unenforceable.  After thoroughly reviewing the briefing 
on this issue and the declarations submitted in support thereof, as well as hearing argument from 
each side at the hearing on the motion, the Court holds that the arbitration provision is valid and 
enforceable and covers the claims at issue here, such that Google’s motion to compel arbitration 
must be granted and its motion to dismiss must be granted as to the claim for declaratory relief 
that the arbitration provision is unconscionable. 
As an initial matter, Trudeau does not dispute several facts important to deciding these 
motions.  It is undisputed that Trudeau accepted the 2017 TOS and did not follow the arbitration 
opt out procedures.  See FACC ¶ 32; Sung Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14–17.  It is also undisputed that if Section 
13(A) is valid and enforceable as to claims that accrued before the 2017 TOS was enacted (what 
Trudeau deems to be “retroactive” application), the scope of that provision covers the claims at 
issue here.  See 2017 TOS § 13(A) (governing “all disputes and claims between Google and 
Customer . . . that arise out of or relate in any way to the Programs or these Terms”); Mot. at 12.  
The key dispute then is whether the arbitration provision can cover claims that accrued before the 
2017 TOS was enacted. 
It also appears from Trudeau’s Opposition that he abandons his declaratory relief claim 
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that the arbitration provision is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  Compare FACC 
¶¶ 107–114 (seeking declaratory relief that clause is unconscionable) with Opp. at 4–14 (arguing 
arbitration provision is unenforceable for other reasons).  To the extent Trudeau has not waived 
this argument, the Court rejects it and dismisses this cause of action with prejudice.  Under 
California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable only if it is both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.  See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 
2006).  The Ninth Circuit has held that “the threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability 
analysis is whether the arbitration agreement is adhesive.”  Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 
F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281 (alterations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  “[I]f there is an opportunity to opt out,” the arbitration agreement is 
not adhesive, and thus not procedurally unconscionable.  Id.   
This Court finds that the 2017 TOS provided a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the 
arbitration provision.  Accord Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2018 WL 
1876950, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (“[A]n advertiser’s decision to decline the September 
2017 AdWords Agreement to avoid being subject to the new arbitration provision is a voluntary 
choice given that he or she can easily opt out from that provision . . . .”).  Trudeau does not 
meaningfully dispute the voluntariness of the opt out procedure.  Thus, the arbitration provision is 
not procedurally unconscionable and thus not unconscionable.  As a result, the Court dismisses 
Trudeau’s claim for declaratory relief under Rule 12(b)(6).  Because the Court has taken judicial 
notice of the facts relevant to Trudeau’s unconscionability argument—namely, the existence of 
and procedure for the voluntary opt-out, as well as the 2017 TOS—the Court finds further 
amendment would be futile and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the claim for declaratory relief. 
Instead, Trudeau argues that the arbitration provision does not apply retroactively for three 
reasons:  (1) the plain language of Section 13(A) in the 2017 TOS “does not say that the new 
Dispute Resolution Agreement . . . will apply retroactively to already-accrued claims”; (2) the 
retroactivity provisions in the past versions of the TOS bound Google to making only 
prospectively applicable changes in future versions of the TOS; and (3) California law, 
specifically the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “prohibits the retroactive enforcement of 
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late-added contractual terms, at least as to claims that ha[ve] ‘accrued’ before the clause was 
added.”  The Court addresses each argument in turn. 
A. The Plain Language of the 2017 Terms of Service 
Trudeau argues that, “on its face, the new arbitration clause in Section 13(A) does not 
apply retroactively.”  Opp. at 10.  Section 12 of the 2017 TOS states in part that “[o]ther than 
changes made under Section 13(G), changes to the Terms will not apply retroactively . . . .”  2017 
TOS § 12.  And Section 13(G) covers only future changes to Section 13’s arbitration provision.  
Id. § 13(G).  Trudeau argues that Section 12’s application exclusively to Section 13(G) indicates 
that it does not apply to Section 13(A) (the arbitration provision), such that the 2017 TOS 
arbitration provision does not apply retroactively.  See Opp. at 10–11.   
At the same time, Trudeau recognizes that Section 13(A)(2) “seems to imbue [Section 
13(A)] with retroactive effect, by providing that the new dispute resolution clause applies to, inter 
alia, ‘claims that arose before Customer or Advertiser first accepted any version of these Terms 
containing an arbitration provision.’”  Opp. at 11 (quoting 2017 TOS § 13(A)(2)).  Trudeau argues 
that Section 13(A)(2) must be read in light of Section 12’s “general intent” that no term apply 
retroactively except for changes made pursuant to Section 13(G).  Id.  He also argues that to the 
extent Section 12 and Section 13(A)(2) can be said to conflict, the only way to reconcile them is to 
understand Section 13(A)(2) as applying to claims raised under future changes made pursuant to 
Section 12.  Id.  At the very least, he claims, the contracts’ terms are uncertain and should be 
construed against Google, the drafter, under Cal. Civ. Code § 1654.  
 The Court finds that Trudeau’s argument misses the mark, as argued by Google.  See 
Reply at 8–10, ECF 35.  Rather than starting with Section 12, the Court starts with the plain 
language of the arbitration provision.  Section 13(A)(2) expressly covers “claims that arose before 
Customer and Advertiser first accepted any versions of these terms containing an arbitration 
provision.”  2017 TOS § 13(A)(2).  On its face then, the arbitration provision applies to claims 
arising before the 2017 TOS.  Trudeau muddies the point by calling this a “retroactive” application 
of Section 13(A)(2).  “Retroactivity” as it relates to this contract is a question of timing:  Does the 
provision apply as if it had been enacted at some time prior to the time of its actual enactment?  
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Section 13(A)(2) does not apply retroactively—that is, it does not apply as if it had been enacted 
prior to the time of its actual enactment.  Instead, it applies prospectively from the time of 
enactment.  That the scope of Section 13(A) covers claims that accrued prior to enactment does 
not mean that the Section itself has retroactive application. 
 This distinction is made clear by Section 12.  Section 12 states that Google “may make 
non-material changes to these [2017] Terms at any time without notice, but Google will provide 
advance notice of any material changes to these Terms. . . . Other than changes made under 
Section 13(G), the changes to the Terms will not apply retroactively . . . .”  Put simply, Section 12 
states that any future changes to the 2017 Terms will not apply as if they had been present in the 
original 2017 Terms, i.e., as if they had been present in the contract before they were actually 
enacted.  The exception to this provision is for future changes made to the Section 13 Dispute 
Resolution Agreement pursuant to Section 13(G).  Section 12 instructs that those changes can 
have retroactive application, as if they had been present in the TOS all along. 
 Nothing about the potential retroactivity or nonretroactivity of future changes to the 2017 
TOS changes the fact that Section 13(A)’s scope, by its plain terms, covers claims that accrued 
prior to enactment.  That is, Section 13(A) need not apply retroactively in order to cover 
previously accrued claims.  As such, the Court finds no conflict or ambiguity in the terms of the 
2017 TOS and holds that Section 12 does not preclude Section 13(A) from covering previously 
accrued claims. 
B. The Impact of Non-Retroactivity Provisions in Previous Versions of the Terms 
of Service 
Trudeau next argues that even if the 2017 TOS does not bar previously accrued claims by 
its own terms, the existence of non-retroactivity provisions in previous versions of the TOS, which 
Trudeau signed, precluded the 2017 TOS from covering such claims.2  See Opp. at 13–14.  As a 
representative example, Section 11 of the 2013 TOS states that “[c]hanges [to the terms] will not 
apply retroactively and will become effective no sooner than fourteen days after they are posted.”   
                                                 
2  The Court address Trudeau’s argument about the expectations created by these provisions in the 
next section on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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See 2013 TOS § 11; accord Trudeau Decl., Ex. 2 (March 2012 TOS); Id., Ex. 3 (November 2013); 
Id., Ex. 4 (April 2014); Id., Ex. 5 (October 2017).  Trudeau claims that any application of the 2017 
TOS to previously accrued claims would render meaningless Section 11 of the 2013 TOS because 
the 2017 provision would apply retroactively in direct contradiction to the terms of the 2013 TOS.  
See Opp. at 13–14 (citing California case law requiring that contract terms be construed so as not 
to be superfluous).  Finally, Trudeau argues that the existence of the opt out provision does not 
somehow waive the previous non-retroactivity requirement. 
Google claims that this argument is wrong for two key reasons.  First, the 2017 TOS is “a 
novation that extinguished the prior 2013 Terms, including former Section 11.”  Opp. at 3 (citing 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1531).  Because Google gave the advertisers notice and the ability to opt out, the 
2017 TOS constituted a new contract that superseded the terms of the 2013 TOS in full.  Id. (citing 
James v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-cv-02218-EMC, 2016 WL 4269898, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug 15. 
2016)).  Second, Google argues that even if 2013 TOS Section 11 still governed, it deals only with 
changes to the Terms unilaterally implemented by Google and then subsequently posted on its 
website.  Id. at 4–5.  Because Google did not simply post the 2017 TOS changes to its website, but 
instead gave the advertisers direct notice and required express acceptance, Section 11 is 
inapplicable. 
The Court again agrees with Google.  A novation requires (1) a previous valid obligation; 
(2) the agreement of all parties to the contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) 
the validity of the new one.  See James, 2016 WL 4269898, at *2.  It is clear from the 2017 TOS 
terms and the context in which it was signed that these requirements are met here.  Each of the 
requirements save the third is undisputed.  As to the third, by its plain terms, the 2017 TOS terms 
represent “the parties’ entire agreement relating to their subject matter and supersede any prior or 
contemporaneous agreements on those subjects.”  2017 TOS § 14(d); see James, 2016 WL 
4269898 (finding novation where contract with arbitration provision had similar language).  And 
Section 11 of the 2013 TOS confirms this understanding, as Google points out.  The 2017 TOS 
was not mere changes enacted by Google and then posted on its website, which advertisers were 
expected to discover by “look[ing] at the[] Terms regularly,” 2013 TOS § 11.  Instead, Google 
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implemented an extensive notice campaign and required that advertisers expressly accept the new 
2017 TOS.  See Sung Decl. ¶¶ 7–9.  Likewise, as admitted by Trudeau, the 2017 TOS was the first 
“substantial” change since the 2013 TOS.  Opp. at 3; see Sung. Decl. ¶¶ 6–7.  Unlike the other 
TOS versions that Trudeau references, which seemingly were mere modifications posted to the 
website, the 2017 TOS constituted a significant change that he was required to sign.  Each of these 
facts supports the argument that the 2017 TOS was a novation. 
Given the language of the 2017 TOS and the context in which it was implemented, the 
Court holds that previous versions of the TOS do not bar the 2017 TOS arbitration provision from 
applying to previously accrued claims. 
C. The Applicability of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under 
California Law 
Trudeau’s final argument is that the arbitration provision is invalid under California’s 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“covenant”) because “[e]very Court of Appeal to 
have considered whether a party may unilaterally modify an arbitration clause to retroactively 
cover claims that have already accrued has agreed” that the covenant bars such retroactive 
application.  Opp. at 5; see id. at 5–9 (citing cases).  According to Trudeau, California appellate 
courts have followed the decision in Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 204 Cal. App. 4th 1425 
(2012), in holding that the covenant “prohibits a party from making unilateral changes to an 
arbitration agreement that apply retroactively to accrued or known claims because doing so would 
unreasonably interfere with the opposing party’s expectations regarding how the agreement 
applied to those claims.”  Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Cal. App. 4th 960, 966 (Ct. App. 
2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).   
Trudeau seems to argue both that the retroactivity of the 2017 TOS arbitration provision is 
unenforceable in its own right, see Opp. at 8–9, and that the non-retroactivity provisions in 
previous versions of the Terms contribute to that conclusion.  As to the 2017 TOS themselves, he 
relies on the Peleg line of cases to argue that the retroactivity of an arbitration provision is barred 
wholesale.  As to the other versions of the TOS, Trudeau argues that Google’s long line of Terms 
not allowing for retroactive application would have instilled in the advertisers a reasonable 
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expectation that the 2017 TOS also did not apply retroactively.  See id. at 8.  And, according to 
Trudeau, the opt out provision would not have changed those expectations.  
Google responds that the Peleg line of cases are inapposite because they apply only to 
unilateral changes to the arbitration agreement.  See Reply at 6–8.  Google argues by way of 
example that in Peleg, the Court held a contractual term to be illusory because it would have 
allowed the employer to “amend the contract in anticipation of a specific claim, altering the 
arbitration process to the employee’s detriment” via mere notice to the employee.   Id. at 6; see id. 
(distinguishing Cobb).  Google argues that the circumstances are vastly different here, where the 
advertisers had to accept the agreement and were given multiple opportunities to opt out.  Finally, 
Google argues that the advertisers could not have reasonably expected the arbitration provision not 
to govern previously accrued claims because the express terms of the 2017 TOS in Section 
13(A)(2) demonstrate that such claims are covered.  See Reply at 5. 
The Court agrees with Google that California law does not bar enforcement of the 
arbitration provision here.  The Peleg court was concerned with potentially illusory contract terms 
by which an employer could change the terms of the arbitration provision at any time, even after a 
dispute had arisen.  204 Cal. App. 4th at 1446 (analogizing to Texas case in which the contract 
included a clause allowing the employer to “unilaterally modify any of the contract terms,” such 
that “nothing [in the contract] would bind the employer to any of its terms”).  The cases that rely 
on Peleg confirm this understanding.  See Cobb, 233 Cal. App. 4th at 963 (“When one party to a 
contract retains the unilateral right to amend the agreement . . . , its exercise of that right is 
constrained by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which precludes amendments that 
operate retroactively to impair accrued rights” (emphasis added)); Avery v. Integrated Healthcare 
Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 50, 61 (Ct. App. 2013) (invalidating modification to arbitration 
provision where employer “unilaterally modified” the agreement based on a provision allowing it 
to “change or modify [the contract] from time-to-time without advance notice and without the 
consent of employees.”).  The 2017 TOS arbitration provision does not run afoul of this caselaw.  
Google did not unilaterally change the 2017 TOS to add an arbitration provision.  Instead, it 
provided ample notice to the advertisers, required them to accept or decline, and gave them a valid 
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opportunity to opt out.  See Sung Decl. ¶¶ 7–9; 16–18.  Simply put, there was no unilateral 
amendment of the contract that might render the provision illusory, and thus warrant application of 
the covenant. 
And as to the reasonable expectations of the advertisers, as explained above, the Court 
does not find the terms of the contract to be uncertain or ambiguous.  Section 13(A)(2) expressly 
applies the arbitration provision to previously accrued claims on its face.  The Court finds it would 
not be reasonable to construe that provision as not applying retroactively, even given the history of 
the Terms.  See Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1211 (“[O]ne who signs a contract is bound by its 
provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument.” (citation 
omitted)).  Thus, the Court holds that the arbitration provision is not invalid as a matter of 
California law.   
Because none of Trudeau’s arguments is sufficient to rebut the plain language of the 2017 
TOS and because Trudeau expressly accepted those terms and refused to opt out, the Court finds 
that he is bound by the arbitration provision. 
IV. ORDER 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.  
Each claim that Trudeau has asserted in this action, except his claim for declaratory relief, is 
subject to arbitration according to the terms of the 2017 Terms of Service.  Google’s Motion to 
Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART, as to Trudeau’s claim for declaratory relief that the arbitration 
provision is unconscionable, and TERMINATED AS MOOT IN PART, as to his other claims 
which are subject to arbitration.  There being no remaining claims outside of arbitration, the entire 
action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing a later action to confirm or vacate the 
arbitration award. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  October 3, 2018 
 ______________________________________ 
BETH LABSON FREEMAN 
United States District Judge 
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